Cycldek: Bridging the (air) gap

Cycldek: Bridging the (air) gap

Key findings


While investigating attacks related to a group named Cycldek post 2018, we were able to uncover various pieces of information on its activities that were not known thus far. In this blog post we aim to bridge the knowledge gap on this group and provide a more thorough insight into its latest activities and modus operandi. Here are some key insights that will be described in this publication:


Cycldek (also known as Goblin Panda and Conimes) has been active in the past two years, conducting targeted operations against governments in Southeast Asia.
Our analysis shows two distinct patterns of activity, indicating the group consists of two operational entities that are active under a mutual quartermaster.
We were able to uncover an extensive toolset for lateral movement and information stealing used in targeted networks, consisting of custom and unreported tools as well as living-off-the-land binaries.
One of the newly revealed tools is named USBCulprit and has been found to rely on USB media in order to exfiltrate victim data. This may suggest Cycldek is trying to reach air-gapped networks in victim environments or relies on physical presence for the same purpose.

Background


Cycldek is a long-known Chinese-speaking threat actor. Based on the group’s past activity, it has a strong interest in Southeast Asian targets, with a primary focus on large organizations and government institutions in Vietnam. This is evident from a series of targeted campaigns that are publicly attributed to the group, as outlined below:


2013 – indicators affiliated to the group were found in a network of a technology company operating in several sectors, as briefly described by CrowdStrike.
2014 – further accounts by CrowdStrike describe vast activity by the group against Southeast Asian ..

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