Emotet Command and Control Case Study

Emotet Command and Control Case Study

Executive Summary


On March 8, 2021, Unit 42 published “Attack Chain Overview: Emotet in December 2020 and January 2021.” Based on that analysis, the updated version of Emotet talks to different command and control (C2) servers for data exfiltration or to implement further attacks. We observed attackers taking advantage of a sophisticated evasion technique and encryption algorithm to communicate with C2 servers in order to probe the victim's network environment and processes, allowing attackers to steal a user’s sensitive information or drop a new payload.


In this blog, we provide a step-by-step technical analysis, beginning from where the main logic starts, covering the encryption mechanisms and ending when the C2 data is exfiltrated through HTTP protocol to the C2 server.


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Technical Analysis


This analysis will use custom function names (i.e., collect_process_data) that replace the regular IDA Pro's function format (i.e., sub_*) and will assume a 32-bit (x86) DLL executable with an image base address of 0x2E1000. The user can refer to the following image that contains function offsets, names and custom names for easy reference.


NOTE: Sub-functions used are not listed, since these can be easily located from the presented function offsets.


Figure 1. IDA’s functions reference information.

The present analysis begins from the entry point function c2_logic_ep (sub_2E2C63).