Stick a fork in SGX, it's done: Intel's cloud-server security defeated by $30 chip and electrical shenanigans

Stick a fork in SGX, it's done: Intel's cloud-server security defeated by $30 chip and electrical shenanigans

Boffins at the University of Birmingham in the UK have developed yet another way to compromise the confidentiality of Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) secure enclaves, supposed "safe rooms" for sensitive computation.


Over the past few years, the security of SGX, a set of security-oriented instructions used to set up so-called secure enclaves, has been assailed repeatedly by infosec types. These enclaves are intended to house software and data that not even the computer's administrators, operating system, applications, users, and owners can access: we're talking software like anti-piracy aka DRM measures that decode encrypted media streams, and sensitive cryptography in cloud servers. The enclaves are supposed to ensure that no one can snoop on code and information whether it's running in people's bedrooms or in cloud environments.


Skepticism in 2016
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