“There's been a proliferation of iOS vulnerabilities recently,” says Johns Hopkins University cryptographer Matthew Green. “There was a brief period around 2015 when Apple's security outpaced the commercially available exploit market, and that period seems to be over.”
It’s unclear exactly how the FBI got the passcodes it needed. But the agency’s success in cracking the iPhones in its possession seems to undermine its central argument that Apple and other companies allow criminals to “go dark” by providing strong encryption on consumer devices. As in 2016 with the San Bernardino case, agents got in eventually.
“Using a device with known security flaws, like the iPhone 7 Plus, or a device without the latest security features, like an iPhone 5 which lacks the Secure Enclave, is a straightforward way to ensure law enforcement can access your phone when needed,” adds Guido.
That may explain why the tenor of both Wray and Attorney General William Barr’s argument against encryption appeared to have shifted slightly. Rather than decrying the impossibility of gaining access, both Barr and Wray focused today on the investigatory costs of how long it took to do so. “The delay from getting into these devices didn’t just divert our personnel from other important work. It also seriously hampered this investigation,” said Wray. “Finally getting our hands on the evidence Alshamrani tried to keep from us is great, but we really needed it months ago, back in December, when the court issued its warrants.”
That timeline’s not quite right. Apple did respond to those early warrants, handing over what it describes as gigabytes of iCloud, account, and transactional data related to the case. The FBI didn’t tell Apple that there was a second iPhone, or that it was unable to access either device, until January ..
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