The outstanding stealth of Operation Triangulation

The outstanding stealth of Operation Triangulation

Introduction


In our previous blogpost on Triangulation, we discussed the details of TriangleDB, the main implant used in this campaign, its C2 protocol and the commands it can receive. We mentioned, among other things, that it is able to execute additional modules. We also mentioned that this operation was quite stealthy. This article details one important aspect of this attack – the stealth that was exercised by the threat actor behind it. Along the way, we will also reveal more information about the components used in this attack.


Validation components


In our previous blogposts, we outlined the Operation Triangulation infection chain: a device receives a malicious iMessage attachment that launches a chain of exploits, and their execution ultimately results in the launch of the TriangleDB implant. In more detail, the infection chain can be summarized with the following graph:



Apart from the exploits and components of the TriangleDB implant, the infection chain contains two “validator” stages, namely “JavaScript Validator” and “Binary Validator”. These validators collect various information about the victim device and send it to the C2 server. This information is then used to assess if the iPhone or iPad to be implanted with TriangleDB could be a research device. By performing such checks, attackers can make sure that their 0-day exploits and the implant do not get burned.


JavaScript Validator


At the beginning of the infection chain, the victim receives an invisible iMessage attachment with a zero-click exploit. The ultimate goal of this exploit is to silently open a unique URL on the backuprabbit[.]com domain. The HTML page hosted on that URL conta ..

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