Is French cyber-sovereignty a chimera?


In terms of cybersecurity, sovereignty rests on three pillars: software, infrastructure and skills. Although France can pride itself on being at the forefront in certain areas, it is depriving itself of some of its skills for cultural and organisational reasons.



Over the years, technological innovations and the digitalisation of all areas - private and professional - have gone hand in hand with ever more numerous and sophisticated threats. Ransomware, espionage, social engineering, cloud, IoT, AI... cyber risk is ubiquitous, so much so that cybersecurity is (or should be) an integral part of companies’ overall strategy.


At the same time, the growing power of the GAFAMs - which are competing with that of the States - and their stranglehold on data are giving rise to debate and concern.


These two major issues have gradually given rise to the notion of digital sovereignty. This cyber-sovereignty is now at the heart of the ability of States to control the security of their national and extra-territorial cyberspace. Not a day goes by without it being put to the test, and it is condemned to evolve constantly to adapt to the constant sophistication of threats.


The conditions for cyber-sovereignty


Cyber-sovereignty is never achieved once and for all, and depends on multiple factors. Among them, technological dependence on foreign countries is probably one of the most decisive. This technological dependence concerns two main areas: software and IT infrastructure. The more one relies on foreign technologies, the less cyber-sovereign one is.


The second essential factor is domestic skills. Digital sovereignty cannot be built and developed without expertise and mastery of the most advanced technical skills. This is a delicate issue: on the one hand, the best skills must be recruited, and on the other, th ..

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