To be honest, it was the impracticality and inefficiency that first attracted us to this otherwise cunning exfiltration
Boffins from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and Shamoon College of Engineering in Israel have come up with yet another TEMPEST-style attack to exfiltrate data from an air-gapped computer: leaking binary signals invisibly by slightly modulating the light coming off its monitor.
TEMPEST, or Telecommunications Electronics Material Protected from Emanating Spurious Transmission, refers to an NSA specification designed to prevent the capture of thermal, acoustic, optical, electronic, or kinetic device emanations that might convey information about a protected system.
The researchers who developed this screen illumination scheme, Mordechai Guri, Dima Bykhovsky, and Yuval Elovici, have ..
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