Detection evasion in CLR and tips on how to detect such attacks

Detection evasion in CLR and tips on how to detect such attacks

In terms of costs, the age-old battle that pits attacker versus defender has become very one sided in recent years. Almost all modern attacks (and ethical offensive exercises) use Mimikatz, SharpHound, SeatBelt, Rubeus, GhostPack and other toolsets available to the community. This so-called githubification is driving attackers’ costs down and reshaping the focus from malware development to the evasion of security mechanisms. What’s the point of creating a tool that can be detected by EPP solutions when you can gain more by simply reusing existing tools and learning how to perform attacks with them? It places the onus – and costs – on the defender who suddenly needs new expertise, tools and processes.


Fileless and malwareless attacks, heavy usage of the LOLBAS list, runtime encryption, downloaders, packers, as well as old, repurposed and completely new techniques to evade a variety of security tools and controls – all these are actively used by attackers. No one is surprised by Mimikatz being embedded in InstallUtil.exe. In our article we will describe an evasion technique that can be employed to hide offensive activities in the memory, na ..

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